Epoch Times obtained some official documents from Beijing City that required funeral homes in Beijing to established a one-to-one partnership with each and every major hospital in Beijing, to provide 365 x 24 service (around the clock throughout the year).

On April 17, Beijing Hospital Management Center issued “The Notice on Rolling Out The Mortuary Management Pilot Program in Tiantan Hospital to All Municipal Hospitals.” It asked hospitals to choose a nearby funeral home and set up a workstation inside the hospital for that partner funeral home, so that the funeral home could provide 365 x 24 service to people in the hospital.

The Beijing Hospital Management Center arranged a teleconference meeting on April 21 with hospitals under the municipal government’s direct supervision to discuss the notice on the mortuary management.

Back on February 8, the Beijing Health Commission, the Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau, and the Beijing Public Security Bureau jointly issued a “Guidance on Handling the Corpses of Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia Patients.” It stated all corpses must be cremated in a nearby funeral home, that they are not allowed to be buried, kept, or transferred; and that the bodies may not be used for any funeral ceremony.

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• Death Count: Wuhan Distributed an Estimate of over 40,000 Urns
• Death Count: Placing Patient in Corpse Bag While Alive

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A Research Team from Hong Kong University published a thesis in The Lancet Journal, pointing out, “If China had adopted the fifth version of its coronavirus infection definition from the beginning of the outbreak and had sufficient detection capabilities, we estimate that by February 20, China would have reported 232,000 infection cases, rather than the 55,008 it officially announced.”

The thesis also stated that “considering that some infections, especially those mild or asymptomatic infections, can still remain undetected under the most lenient definition, the actual infection count is likely be higher than the estimated number.”

From January 15 to March 3, China issued seven versions of the “Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia Treatment Plan,” which covered the case definition, clinical characteristics, and diagnosis. The first version, the most rigid definition, required that the patient must have an epidemiological link to the South China Seafood Market and must have four types of symptoms. The fourth revision started allowing the patients to have an epidemiological link to other regions that had confirmed infection cases, not limited to Wuhan. The fifth revision allowed the doctor to use a clinical diagnosis to decide if the patient was infected.

Their research concluded that the loosening of rigid requirements had a “substantial impact” on the infection count. The infection count increased 7.1 times after switching from the version 1 definition to version 2 and 4.2 times after switching from version 4 to version 5.

Related postings on Chinascope:

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• Infection Count: China Started Reporting Count of Asymptomatic Virus Carriers
• Infection Count: 60 Percent Hidden Infection Cases in Wuhan Are Not Reported

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Epoch Times obtained some official documents from the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (AR) that show the AR is facing an outbreak of Black Death.

1. The “Epidemic Report” that the Inner Mongolia Comprehensive Disease Prevention and Control Center issued on April 13 stated: “Since the determination of the first epidemic case on March 15, 2020,” the black death epidemic was found in 21 sites in 10 counties of four Leagues (an administrative region under the Inner Mongolia AR, similar to Prefectures in the other provinces of China; a few major cities are also included in this category).

2. On April 14, Xilingol League passed an AR “Epidemic Report” down to its subordinate medical agencies.

3. The “Report on the Implementation of the Decision from the AR’s Teleconference on Black Death Prevention and Control” in April stated, “The black death plague is active” in Inner Mongolia and “the risk of human infection is still high.” “Recently, cases have been reported in Baotou City, Wulanchabu City, Xilingol League, and Bayannaoer City.” The report also stated, “By March 30, except for Wulanchabu City, the AR’s other 11 Leagues have all established or regrouped their Black Death Epidemic Prevention and Control Emergency Leading Groups.

4. On March 30, Xilingol League submitted an application requesting 320,000 yuan (US $45,000) to buy smoke cannons to kill rats, in response to the “severe situation in controlling the black death.”

5. On November 12, 2019, Beijing confirmed two patients with black death who came from Xilingol League and started an emergency medical response. On November 20, 2019, China’s National Health Commission sent a notice to Beijing, Tianjin, Inner Mongolia AR, and several other provinces, stating that “the Party Central Committee and State Council are paying close attention” to the Inner Mongolia black death epidemic which was active and presented risks of infecting people and spreading to Beijing or other big cities.

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• Hiding Information: Chaoyang District in Beijing Has Many Coronavirus Infection Cases
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Epoch Times analyzed the official data the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) published on the coronavirus infection and on the hospitalized patients in Wuhan. It found that there are several holes in the CCP numbers.

1. Confirmed Infected Count = Hospitalized Count

On April 16, the CCP readjusted the Wuhan infection number to 50,333 and the death toll to 3,869.

On April 26, the Wuhan Health Commission announced that “the number of coronavirus infected patients staying in hospital became 0… The cumulative count of patients hospitalized is 50,333.”

This means the all confirmed infected patients are hospitalized, with a 100 percent hospitalization rate.

Taking New York to compare. By April 30, there were 159,865 confirmed cases, among which 41,316 were hospitalized. The hospitalization ratio is 25.84 percent of the confirmed patients.

The Wuhan Health Commission also stated that “the peak count of hospitalized patients was on February 18; it reached 38,020.” On February 18, Wuhan also announced 38,020 confirmed cases. Again, a 100 percent hospitalization rate.

2. Holes in Hospitalization Count

On January 28, the Wuhan Health Commission website said, “From January 22 to January 27, 75,221 people with a fever visited the hospital.” The hospital beds usage report that the Wuhan Health Commission released on February 1 showed this number “beds used: 6,808.” This means that only 9 percent of the 75,221 people who had a fever were hospitalized and thus counted in the CCP’s infection count. However, those 75,221 people were likely to be infected with the coronavirus.

On February 18, the Wuhan Health Commission stated 38,020 people were hospitalized. Its websites announced 18,393 hospital beds were occupied on the same day. If 38,020 were hospitalized, where did the other 19,627 (= 38,020 – 18,393) patients go?

The modular hospitals could hold patients. The Wuhan Health Commission website stated, “On March 10, all 16 modular hospitals in Wuhan were closed. They have treated a total of 12,000 patients with mild infection symptoms.” On February 20, the website of Changjiang Daily, a newspaper under the Wuhan Party Committee, mentioned “by February 20, eight modular hospitals released a total of 616 recovered patients.” So on February 18, there were likely only eight modular hospitals in operation. Since 16 modular hospitals treated 12,000 patients, the 8 modular hospitals in operation then might treated 6,000 patients.

Still, there are 13,627 (= 38,020 – 18,393 – 6,000) patients that the government claimed to be hospitalized but could not be matched to any hospital beds. Had they died in the hospital and thus no longer needed beds?

3. Severe Cases vs. Mild Cases

The modular hospitals were to treat the patients with mild cases. The Wuhan Health Commission said the modular hospitals handled 12,000 mild cases and a total of 46,464 patients were cured in hospitals. That means 34,464 (= 46,464 – 12,000) patients were in the regular hospitals. If the majority of the 34,464 patients were severe cases (since they were not at the modular hospitals), it would mean there were many more severe cases than mild cases, or it would mean many mild cases were simply not counted by the government.

4. Medical Staff Headcounts

On February 6, the Wuhan Health Commission mentioned “80,000 healthcare staff workers were at the front line of the fight against the coronavirus.” This would mean Wuhan has about 80,000 medical staff members.

On March 26, , the Wuhan Health Commission website stated, “By March 24, 141 medical teams came to support Wuhan, with 14,649 medical staff, returned to their home cities. Still 139 teams with 16,558 medical staff members remain in Wuhan.” That means 31,207 (=14,469 + 16,558) medical staffs came from other cities to support Wuhan.

State Council mentioned that “over 40,000 medical support personnel came to Wuhan, with 28,600 nurses, accounting for 68 percent of the group.” That will give 42,059 (= 28,600 / 68%) medical staffs coming from other cities to Wuhan.

If we take 80,000 of Wuhan’s own medical staff members and 40,000 supporting staff members from other cities, that is over 120,000 on the medical staff. {Editor’s note: Epoch Times didn’t mention this point in its writing: We know some of Wuhan’s medical staff were infected. Even if half of the population was infected, that means still 40,000 Wuhan medical staff members and 40,000 supporting staff members were working there. With 80,000 medical staff members on board, were they all only treating the 50,333 infected patients that the CCP claimed on April 26?}

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• Infection Count: Changjiang Daily Reported a Coronavirus Case on a Day That the Government Reported Zero
• Infection Count: On February 13, Caixin Questioned Wuhan Infection Number

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Epoch Times analyzed the official data that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) published on the coronavirus infection and virus testing in Wuhan from January to March. It showed that the Wuhan government was severely behind in testing to confirm infections. This is likely to indicate that many infections probably went unconfirmed (as suspected cases) or unidentified (as there was nothing recorded at all).

Epoch Times reported the following:

On January 27, Wuhan announced that 892 cases were newly confirmed on that day and a total of 1,590 cumulative cases were confirmed. On January 29, the Wuhan Health Commission website stated, “From January 23 to January 27, (we) have tested a total of 4,086 samples among which 712 were positive.” This leads to two questions:

• Since China had very a rigid rule on confirming the coronavirus infection and the nucleic acid testing is a mandatory step, how did Wuhan confirm the 1,590 infection cases while only 712 samples tested positive?
• How could Wuhan confirm 892 cases alone on January 27, which is even more than the 712 positive tests (from January 23 to January 27)?

On January 29, the Wuhan Health Commission website said, “Due to the high pathogenicity of the virus, researchers need to go through a gradual process to familiarize themselves with the testing process, so they will not test 2,000 samples per day from the beginning, but rather (they will start low and) gradually increase the number.” This means that though the government had the ability to test 2,000 samples, they did not do that many then.

On January 28, the Wuhan Health Commission website said, “Visits of fever patients have been increasing daily. The peak is over 15,000 people.” Even if Wuhan tested 2,000 samples, they were still be severely below the 15,000 fever patients.

On January 28, the Wuhan Health Commission website said, “From January 22 to January 27, a total of 75,221 people came to be checked for fever.” Wuhan tested only 4,086 samples during that period.

On March 3, the Wuhan Health Commission website said, “Nucleic acid tests were given to 18,127 people on the day of March 1. In the past three days, Wuhan conducted an average of 20,466 tests per day. (Regular) hospitals and modular hospitals mainly used the test for existing patients, not to confirm new cases.” This means it is likely that the government did more than 10,000 tests on confirmed patients and less than 10,000 tests were used to test new cases per day.

{Editor’s note: Epoch Times didn’t mention this point in its writing, but one may ask, if Wuhan did over 10,000 tests on confirmed patients each day and if it tested each patient twice in the duration of the treatment, that would mean the government would have tested 50,000 confirmed patients in 10 days, and 150,000 confirmed patients in 30 days.}

On March 26, the Wuhan Health Commission website said, “The whole city conducted nucleic acid tests on 9,844 people on March 24.” It is still less than 10,000 tests per day.

Therefore, the city has done less than 10,000 tests for new infection cases per day. Even if the city did 10,000 tests every day from January 23 to March 23, it would have only tested 600,000 people. For a city of 15 million people, that’s 4 percent of the population.

Thus, the testing is significantly insufficient.

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• Lack of Action: National Health Commission Delayed 15 Days to Share the Coronavirus Information
• Lack of Action: Official Documents in Early January Showed the Government Was Aware of the “SARS-Like” Pneumonia
• Lack of Action: Both Central and Local Government Didn’t Do Enough
• Lack of Action: “Voice of China” Internally Reported Up About Coronavirus on Jan 1

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