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Public Opinion: “Four Things Not Anticipated”

A Chinese article titled, “Four Things Not Anticipated and Ten Points” was spread on the Internet recently. The article, commenting on how Beijing has misjudged the U.S., was said to be written by Dai Xu, a strategist with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

However, Dai Xu, a China’s military hawk, issued a statement on his Weibo account that he didn’t write this article. (#1, Weibo)

Later, Chinascope found that a copy of the article, said to be written by Ling A’feng, was posted on the Internet on July 15, 2018. (#2, CReaders)

The points in the article are worth reading though, as they show a moderate or liberal view from the Chinese side on U.S. and China relations. The following are highlights of the points from the article (#3, U.S.-China Perception Monitor):

As to the Sino-U.S. relations, there are a few things that the Chinese people did not anticipate that would happen:

  • The U.S. has such a big antagonism against China. The Chinese people never thought that the U.S. government would run its public relations machine at full strength, denouncing China to the maximum extent, describing China as the “trade hooligans” who should never be forgiven, and pushing the “China threat” theory to a new level.
  • The U.S. government has acted so ruthlessly, in such a short time frame, and given (China) no time to negotiate.
  • Not a single country has stood up to show sympathy and support for China.
  • The Republic Party and the Democratic Party in the U.S. have formed a united front (against China).

China must revise its understanding of the U.S.:

  1. Don’t assume that the U.S. is a “paper tiger” (a Chinese idiom for something that looks powerful from outside but is actually weak). On the contrary, the U.S. is a real tiger and can eat people.
  2. Don’t hope that the U.S. will forever make mistakes. It has a correction mechanism for its mistakes and will not forever carry the ‘political correctness’ policy.
  3. The U.S. does not pay serious attention to ideology and value systems; it only cares about economic and trade interests.
  4. Do not go to the U.S. to say it openly, “I want to surpass you and replace you; I want to be the world’s number one.”
  5. The U.S. is not afraid of offending someone. It has many allies, but it, for sure, will not sacrifice its own interests to please an ally.
  6. China should acknowledge that the U.S. is the “world’s number one.” Though it might be hard (for some Chinese) to accept it emotionally, but emotion cannot replace reality.
  7. Do not mention “sharing information” in front of the U.S. The U.S. is big on intellectual property. If you keep showing off your achievements obtained from “information sharing,” then you are a “technology thief” in the eyes of the U.S.
  8. The U.S. is a master at playing strategy games. Don’t let the Americans aim their strategies at you.
  9. Don’t hope that the Presidential election in the U.S. will change its national strategy.
  10. Don’t naively assume that you are fighting just the U.S. The U.S. has a lot of strategic allies. It represents universal values. If it acts, other countries will follow; even if some countries may not want to follow, eventually they will still line up with the U.S. Keep this in mind: if the U.S. increases 30 billion dollars in tariffs on you, (you will get) 60 billion, 90 billion, or even more tariffs (as other countries may follow suit).

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Treating People: CCP Abandons Chinese Citizens in Russia

When fighting the coronavirus, many countries make efforts to bring their citizens home from infected countries. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) refused to bring Chinese citizens in Russia home. The China’s Ambassador to Russia said about those Chinese who want to go back to China that they “have no moral bottom line.”

#1. According to China’s media, there are about 150,000 Chinese in Russia, with 27,000 students and others who are merchants and workers. However, the Chinese government has made it hard for them to return to China. First, the government cut its flights. Since March 26, each airline in China is only allowed to make one flight to a foreign country each week; foreign airlines are only allowed to make one flight to China each week. Second, China closed all checkpoints between China and Russia, including Suifenhe, the largest port city near Russia.

On the other hand, Russian authorities have treated Chinese toughly. Sputnik reported that on April 10, Sergey Sobyanin, the Mayor of Moscow, announced that Moscow had deported several dozen Chinese for violating quarantine regulations. The Chinese media, 8 Am Health Insight reported on April 14, that a Chinese businesswoman who managed to return to China said that Russian authorities locked down the Friendship Hotel in Moscow where many Chinese were staying, took away their passports and quarantined them for 14 days.

China’s official media did not report on Russia’s actions, nor did Chinese officials defend its citizens. Nigeria acted differently. When the Chinese officials took away Nigerian citizens’ passports and tried to quarantine them, the Nigerian Consul-General in Guangzhou City fought to get back the passports and told the Chinese official that China had no right to seize them. (See Chinascope post: Diplomacy: Nigeria and African Union Protested China for Targeting Nigerian Citizens)

On April 17, Zhang Hanhui, China’s ambassador to Russia had an online discussion with several representatives of the Chinese in Russia. Zhang issued a criticism that some Chinese people tried to cross the border to go to China so as “to bring the virus into China.” Zhang said, “In order to escape responsibility, they claimed that ‘Russia will not let us stay.’ Their action is disgusting! (They are) eating the meal of Sino-Russian cooperation but smashing the pot of Sino-Russian relations. They have no moral bottom line.”

On April 13, the Heilongjiang government issued a notice to encourage people to report anyone who crossed the Sino-Russian border and offered a 3,000 yuan (US $430) reward for tips and 5,000 yuan for the arrest of anyone crossing the border. (See Chinascope post: Infection Count: Heilongjiang Awards 3,000 Yuan for Reporting People Crossing Border) (Epoch Times)

#2: Many Chinese in Russia indeed got infected. On April 20, China found 30 infected patients and 8 asymptomatic carriers on a flight from Moscow to Beijing. The flight landed in Xi’an first since China requires all international flights to Beijing to stop at another Chinese city first to be checked. (Beijing News)

#3: Heilongjiang Province decided to provide free room and board and a free coronavirus test to a Russian smuggler, who was arrested in Sunfenhe. However, the CCP requires all Chinese citizens returning to China from Russia to pay for their own expenses during the mandatory quarantine and does not offer them a free virus test. (Epoch Times)

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Infection Count: China Faces the Threat of Several Plagues

As China faces the threat of a second wave of the coronavirus outbreak, it also faces several other plagues.

  1. The Decapod Iridescent Virus 1: This virus was detected in 2014. It is a highly contagious virus among shrimp and can also kill lobsters and crabs. It will not infect humans but there are concerns that the virus might mutate. On April 12, a Chinese magazine, the Fishing Frontline Magazine, reported that this virus was found in 11 provinces in China, mainly in the South, including Guangdong and Fujian. It can wipe out 60 percent of the shrimp in a pond. There is no effective treatment for this virus.
  2. African Horse Sickness Virus: On April 23, China’s Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Disease Control Center, and China Horse Industry Association jointly issued a notice to inform the local government to be vigilant about this virus. It said the death rate from this virus is 95 percent. China issued a warning about this horse virus back in May 2019. The virus hit Thailand in March of this year.
  3. The Black Death: According to an Inner Mongolia document, the black death plague was spreading in its area. (See Chinascope posting: Hiding Information: Inner Mongolia May Have Black Death Outbreak)
  4. The African Swine Fever Virus: This virus spread widely in China last year and caused the death of millions of pigs. Since March of this year, the Ministry of Agriculture has reported 13 epidemic cases in Hubei, Sichuan, and other provinces. On April 16, Jinmen (an island that belongs to Taiwan, only 2 km away from mainland China) found dead pigs, which had the swine fever virus, floating in the sea. This would mean that mainland farmers killed the infected pigs and threw them into the sea.
  5. Hepatitis A: In early March, over 100 people in Liaoning Province were infected with the Hepatitis A virus. The Paper reported that police had admonished several people who spread the infection news on the Internet, similar to what the Wuhan government did to people informing others about the coronavirus.
  6. Avian Influenza: On April 14, videos posted on the Internet showed that the Avian influenza was spreading in Juye County, Shandong Province. Tens of thousands of chickens died in 2.5 hours.

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Death Count: Beijing Pushes for Partnership between Funeral Homes and Hospitals

Epoch Times obtained some official documents from Beijing City that required funeral homes in Beijing to established a one-to-one partnership with each and every major hospital in Beijing, to provide 365 x 24 service (around the clock throughout the year).

On April 17, Beijing Hospital Management Center issued “The Notice on Rolling Out The Mortuary Management Pilot Program in Tiantan Hospital to All Municipal Hospitals.” It asked hospitals to choose a nearby funeral home and set up a workstation inside the hospital for that partner funeral home, so that the funeral home could provide 365 x 24 service to people in the hospital.

The Beijing Hospital Management Center arranged a teleconference meeting on April 21 with hospitals under the municipal government’s direct supervision to discuss the notice on the mortuary management.

Back on February 8, the Beijing Health Commission, the Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau, and the Beijing Public Security Bureau jointly issued a “Guidance on Handling the Corpses of Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia Patients.” It stated all corpses must be cremated in a nearby funeral home, that they are not allowed to be buried, kept, or transferred; and that the bodies may not be used for any funeral ceremony.

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Infection Count: China’s Infection Number Would Have Been 230,000 by February 20 If It Had Used a More Realistic Infection Definition

A Research Team from Hong Kong University published a thesis in The Lancet Journal, pointing out, “If China had adopted the fifth version of its coronavirus infection definition from the beginning of the outbreak and had sufficient detection capabilities, we estimate that by February 20, China would have reported 232,000 infection cases, rather than the 55,008 it officially announced.”

The thesis also stated that “considering that some infections, especially those mild or asymptomatic infections, can still remain undetected under the most lenient definition, the actual infection count is likely be higher than the estimated number.”

From January 15 to March 3, China issued seven versions of the “Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia Treatment Plan,” which covered the case definition, clinical characteristics, and diagnosis. The first version, the most rigid definition, required that the patient must have an epidemiological link to the South China Seafood Market and must have four types of symptoms. The fourth revision started allowing the patients to have an epidemiological link to other regions that had confirmed infection cases, not limited to Wuhan. The fifth revision allowed the doctor to use a clinical diagnosis to decide if the patient was infected.

Their research concluded that the loosening of rigid requirements had a “substantial impact” on the infection count. The infection count increased 7.1 times after switching from the version 1 definition to version 2 and 4.2 times after switching from version 4 to version 5.

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Hiding Information: Inner Mongolia May Have a Black Death Outbreak

Epoch Times obtained some official documents from the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (AR) that show the AR is facing an outbreak of Black Death.

1. The “Epidemic Report” that the Inner Mongolia Comprehensive Disease Prevention and Control Center issued on April 13 stated: “Since the determination of the first epidemic case on March 15, 2020,” the black death epidemic was found in 21 sites in 10 counties of four Leagues (an administrative region under the Inner Mongolia AR, similar to Prefectures in the other provinces of China; a few major cities are also included in this category).

2. On April 14, Xilingol League passed an AR “Epidemic Report” down to its subordinate medical agencies.

3. The “Report on the Implementation of the Decision from the AR’s Teleconference on Black Death Prevention and Control” in April stated, “The black death plague is active” in Inner Mongolia and “the risk of human infection is still high.” “Recently, cases have been reported in Baotou City, Wulanchabu City, Xilingol League, and Bayannaoer City.” The report also stated, “By March 30, except for Wulanchabu City, the AR’s other 11 Leagues have all established or regrouped their Black Death Epidemic Prevention and Control Emergency Leading Groups.

4. On March 30, Xilingol League submitted an application requesting 320,000 yuan (US $45,000) to buy smoke cannons to kill rats, in response to the “severe situation in controlling the black death.”

5. On November 12, 2019, Beijing confirmed two patients with black death who came from Xilingol League and started an emergency medical response. On November 20, 2019, China’s National Health Commission sent a notice to Beijing, Tianjin, Inner Mongolia AR, and several other provinces, stating that “the Party Central Committee and State Council are paying close attention” to the Inner Mongolia black death epidemic which was active and presented risks of infecting people and spreading to Beijing or other big cities.

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Infection Count: The Holes in the CCP’s Announced Wuhan Infection Numbers

Epoch Times analyzed the official data the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) published on the coronavirus infection and on the hospitalized patients in Wuhan. It found that there are several holes in the CCP numbers.

1. Confirmed Infected Count = Hospitalized Count

On April 16, the CCP readjusted the Wuhan infection number to 50,333 and the death toll to 3,869.

On April 26, the Wuhan Health Commission announced that “the number of coronavirus infected patients staying in hospital became 0… The cumulative count of patients hospitalized is 50,333.”

This means the all confirmed infected patients are hospitalized, with a 100 percent hospitalization rate.

Taking New York to compare. By April 30, there were 159,865 confirmed cases, among which 41,316 were hospitalized. The hospitalization ratio is 25.84 percent of the confirmed patients.

The Wuhan Health Commission also stated that “the peak count of hospitalized patients was on February 18; it reached 38,020.” On February 18, Wuhan also announced 38,020 confirmed cases. Again, a 100 percent hospitalization rate.

2. Holes in Hospitalization Count

On January 28, the Wuhan Health Commission website said, “From January 22 to January 27, 75,221 people with a fever visited the hospital.” The hospital beds usage report that the Wuhan Health Commission released on February 1 showed this number “beds used: 6,808.” This means that only 9 percent of the 75,221 people who had a fever were hospitalized and thus counted in the CCP’s infection count. However, those 75,221 people were likely to be infected with the coronavirus.

On February 18, the Wuhan Health Commission stated 38,020 people were hospitalized. Its websites announced 18,393 hospital beds were occupied on the same day. If 38,020 were hospitalized, where did the other 19,627 (= 38,020 – 18,393) patients go?

The modular hospitals could hold patients. The Wuhan Health Commission website stated, “On March 10, all 16 modular hospitals in Wuhan were closed. They have treated a total of 12,000 patients with mild infection symptoms.” On February 20, the website of Changjiang Daily, a newspaper under the Wuhan Party Committee, mentioned “by February 20, eight modular hospitals released a total of 616 recovered patients.” So on February 18, there were likely only eight modular hospitals in operation. Since 16 modular hospitals treated 12,000 patients, the 8 modular hospitals in operation then might treated 6,000 patients.

Still, there are 13,627 (= 38,020 – 18,393 – 6,000) patients that the government claimed to be hospitalized but could not be matched to any hospital beds. Had they died in the hospital and thus no longer needed beds?

3. Severe Cases vs. Mild Cases

The modular hospitals were to treat the patients with mild cases. The Wuhan Health Commission said the modular hospitals handled 12,000 mild cases and a total of 46,464 patients were cured in hospitals. That means 34,464 (= 46,464 – 12,000) patients were in the regular hospitals. If the majority of the 34,464 patients were severe cases (since they were not at the modular hospitals), it would mean there were many more severe cases than mild cases, or it would mean many mild cases were simply not counted by the government.

4. Medical Staff Headcounts

On February 6, the Wuhan Health Commission mentioned “80,000 healthcare staff workers were at the front line of the fight against the coronavirus.” This would mean Wuhan has about 80,000 medical staff members.

On March 26, , the Wuhan Health Commission website stated, “By March 24, 141 medical teams came to support Wuhan, with 14,649 medical staff, returned to their home cities. Still 139 teams with 16,558 medical staff members remain in Wuhan.” That means 31,207 (=14,469 + 16,558) medical staffs came from other cities to support Wuhan.

State Council mentioned that “over 40,000 medical support personnel came to Wuhan, with 28,600 nurses, accounting for 68 percent of the group.” That will give 42,059 (= 28,600 / 68%) medical staffs coming from other cities to Wuhan.

If we take 80,000 of Wuhan’s own medical staff members and 40,000 supporting staff members from other cities, that is over 120,000 on the medical staff. {Editor’s note: Epoch Times didn’t mention this point in its writing: We know some of Wuhan’s medical staff were infected. Even if half of the population was infected, that means still 40,000 Wuhan medical staff members and 40,000 supporting staff members were working there. With 80,000 medical staff members on board, were they all only treating the 50,333 infected patients that the CCP claimed on April 26?}

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Lack of Action: Wuhan Was Severely Behind in Coronavirus Testing from January to March

Epoch Times analyzed the official data that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) published on the coronavirus infection and virus testing in Wuhan from January to March. It showed that the Wuhan government was severely behind in testing to confirm infections. This is likely to indicate that many infections probably went unconfirmed (as suspected cases) or unidentified (as there was nothing recorded at all).

Epoch Times reported the following:

On January 27, Wuhan announced that 892 cases were newly confirmed on that day and a total of 1,590 cumulative cases were confirmed. On January 29, the Wuhan Health Commission website stated, “From January 23 to January 27, (we) have tested a total of 4,086 samples among which 712 were positive.” This leads to two questions:

  • Since China had very a rigid rule on confirming the coronavirus infection and the nucleic acid testing is a mandatory step, how did Wuhan confirm the 1,590 infection cases while only 712 samples tested positive?
  • How could Wuhan confirm 892 cases alone on January 27, which is even more than the 712 positive tests (from January 23 to January 27)?

On January 29, the Wuhan Health Commission website said, “Due to the high pathogenicity of the virus, researchers need to go through a gradual process to familiarize themselves with the testing process, so they will not test 2,000 samples per day from the beginning, but rather (they will start low and) gradually increase the number.” This means that though the government had the ability to test 2,000 samples, they did not do that many then.

On January 28, the Wuhan Health Commission website said, “Visits of fever patients have been increasing daily. The peak is over 15,000 people.” Even if Wuhan tested 2,000 samples, they were still be severely below the 15,000 fever patients.

On January 28, the Wuhan Health Commission website said, “From January 22 to January 27, a total of 75,221 people came to be checked for fever.” Wuhan tested only 4,086 samples during that period.

On March 3, the Wuhan Health Commission website said, “Nucleic acid tests were given to 18,127 people on the day of March 1. In the past three days, Wuhan conducted an average of 20,466 tests per day. (Regular) hospitals and modular hospitals mainly used the test for existing patients, not to confirm new cases.” This means it is likely that the government did more than 10,000 tests on confirmed patients and less than 10,000 tests were used to test new cases per day.

{Editor’s note: Epoch Times didn’t mention this point in its writing, but one may ask, if Wuhan did over 10,000 tests on confirmed patients each day and if it tested each patient twice in the duration of the treatment, that would mean the government would have tested 50,000 confirmed patients in 10 days, and 150,000 confirmed patients in 30 days.}

On March 26, the Wuhan Health Commission website said, “The whole city conducted nucleic acid tests on 9,844 people on March 24.” It is still less than 10,000 tests per day.

Therefore, the city has done less than 10,000 tests for new infection cases per day. Even if the city did 10,000 tests every day from January 23 to March 23, it would have only tested 600,000 people. For a city of 15 million people, that’s 4 percent of the population.

Thus, the testing is significantly insufficient.

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